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In our society today, it is generally accepted that
human resources are the most valuable asset possessed by an
organization. The basis of this premise is simple—regardless
of the state of technology achieved, it remains the task of
people to perform the functions and make the decisions which are
vital to the survival and well-being of any organization.
Technological advances increase the importance of the
human element in the sound management of organizations. Freed
from many routine functions, including less important decision-
making tasks, executives are able to devote a greater percentage
of their time to more critical matters. Technological process
therefore necessitates the recruitment and retention of high
caliber management talent as an aid to organizational vitality.
The major personnel administration tasks of recruitment,
training, promotion, discharge, and retirement must be well
planned and capably administered. Attempts must be made to
maximize the effectiveness of all of these programs, since
unsound practices in any one of them could easily negate the
best administration of the others.
During the past decade, personnel problems have plagued
our military establishment. The scope of this problem is well
illustrated in the following statement by Secretary of the Navy
^aul H. Nitze:

The most important problem which confronts me today as
Secretary of the Navy involves procurement of personnel
and the retention of skilled, experienced military personnel
as careerests in the naval service.
1
In itemizing the various personnel problems facing the
Navy today, Mr. Nitze includes the following:
... Of the 76 thousand officers on active duty in the
Navy, approximately 60% serve in the unrestricted line, the
people who operate the sea-going forces of the fleet. • • •
In recent years, the Navy has experienced a history of
serious retention problems among Junior officer ranks. . . .
Two chief reasons are cited by the Junior officers who
elect to leave the service. The first involves deprivation
of home life and prolonged separation.
The other basic cause of Junior officer separation is
more susceptible to remedies. It involves such factors
as promotion opportunity, . • .2
Promotion opportunity of unrestricted line officers of
the Regular Navy will be discussed in the chapters which follow.
Proposed remedies for this personnel problem will be examined
in an attempt to evaluate their effectiveness in improving this
aspect of personnel management in the Navy.
U. S. , Department of the Navy, Office of the
Comptroller, Budget Digest—Fiscal Year 1966 (NAVSO P-1355),




Promotion and Promotion Systems
Role in personnel administration
Opportunity for advancement and the chance to make the
best possible use of one's capacities form one of the
wellsprings of human motivation.!
This statement, illustrating the importance of promotion
opportunity to the individual, is strengthened by the cultural
aspects of promotion as noted by another writer:
In our society promotions are much coveted. Most
employees • • • have a desire to get ahead. • • • The con-
cept of starting at the bottom of the ladder when one is
young and rising in status and income as one grows older
is part of our culture. • • • Because of the way advancement
is looked upon by the majority in our society, it is
important that organizations adopt and follow sound
promotion policies.
2
The establishment and administration of promotion
practices which act to motivate the individual in our society is
therefore a major task facing personnel management in any
organization.
The absence of such a policy is largely responsible for the
sinking of unknown numbers of men and women of high
potentiality into a state of passive acceptance of their
0. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration
(5th ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1^62), p. 109.
^Dale S. Beach, Personnel: The Management of People at
Work (New York: The MacMillan Co., 19655, pp. 2$0-2$i.

present work and environment as their proper sphere, 1
Another writer, in a text dealing with the civil service, also
stresses the importance of the promotion function in personnel
administration
:
The devising of formal methods of selection for promotion
which shall effectively pick out the best qualified is one
of the most difficult problems in the whole field of
personnel administration. The difficulties are far greater
than those encountered in recruitment; and the consequences
far more serious. 2
Definitions
Basic to further discussion of "promotion" and
"promotion systems" is a clear definition of these words.
Various writers define promotion in slightly different
terms, however, most of the definitions include many common
elements. The basic definition most appropriate to the dis-
cussion in this paper is: "A promotion is a reassignment of the
individual to a Job of higher rank, "3 Beach, in expanding this
definition notes that it normally includes some, or all, of the
following elements:
1) More demands on the individual promoted.
2) Greater scope of responsibility.
3) Increase in pay or salary,
M) Higher status symbols, such as title and authority.
Walter Dill Scott, Robert C, Clothier, and William R.
Spriegel, Personnel Management (5th ed. ; New York: McGraw-Hill
Co., Inc., 1951), p, 16,
o
Lewis Mayers, The Federal Service: A Study of the
System of Personnel Administration of the U, S. Government
*"
(New York: Appleton, 1922), p. 317.
%each, p, 290.

55) Greater freedom In Job and less close supervision. 1
An additional element, which may be Inferred from the five
above, is specifically mentioned by other writers:
6) Increase in prestige and privileges.
Leonard D. White, in discussing promotions in the civil
service, defines a "promotion system" as " , . , the aggregate of
laws, rules, and practices which govern the promotions in any
governmental agency." This definition will apply to the dis-
cussion of promotion systems throughout this paper.
Objectives of a promotion system
Various authors emphasize different minor objectives of
a promotion system, but there is a commonality regarding major
objectives. Two writings are set forth below to illustrate this
point and facilitate later summarization of major objectives of
a sound promotion system. 0. Glenn Stahl has written:
An ideal promotion policy is not Just a sugar plum for
employees. It is, first of all, a plan to insure management
that it will have the benefit of the best talent in the
organization for the toughest Jobs and a reasonable explana-
tion for the promotions it makes when its actions are
questioned. This is at least half the case. The other half
is to Insure employees that promotions are made strictly on
the basis of merit and opportunities are broad and open so
as to minimize the dangers of dead ends or unfairness.
3
Another writer in the field of public personnel administration
sets forth promotion system goals as follows:
^bld
.
Leonard D. White, Introduction to the Study of Public




The principle object of a promotion system is to secure
the best possible incumbents for the higher positions,
while maintaining the morale of the whole organization.
The main interest to be served is the public interest,
not the personal interest of members of the official group
concerned. The public Interest is best secured when rea-
sonable opportunities exist for all qualified employees,
when really superior civil servants are enabled to move as
rapidly up the promotion ladder as their merits deserve and
as vacancies occur, and when selection for promotion is
made on the sole basis of merit. For the merit system
ought to apply as specifically in making promotions as in
original recruitment .1
The two excerpts above can be summarized to provide
four major objectives of a promotion system:
1) Insure higher positions in the organization are
occupied by the best-qualified people available,
2) Serve the best interests of the organization as
opposed to those of Individuals or individual groups,
3) Provide a system that has the confidence of those
whose careers It governs. This includes reasonable and
equitable opportunity for promotion,
4) Provide for promotions based chiefly on merit
(as opposed to seniority).
The fourth objective—merit as opposed to seniority in
promotion selection—is currently receiving renewed attention
in the Navy, Detailed examination of this objective will be
pursued later in this chapter,
U, S, Navy vs, civilian promotion
Up to this point, little has been said, of a specific




7Intention of the author has been to establish basic tenets of
promotion applicable to various types of organizations—business
,
civil service and military. When specific elements of non-
military promotion criteria are examined, however, there are
some which are not applicable to the Navy. A prime example of
this is the extensive discussions, in most writings, which deal
with the advantages/disadvantages of promotion from within as
opposed to external hiring in the filling of vacancies. Except
for a few inter-service transfers of officers from the other
services, under Public Law 85-599, there is no counterpart to
this problem in the Navy,
A significant difference exists in the basic role
promotion plays in the career of a naval officer compared to
that of a civilian. In most non-military pursuits, provision is
made for a man to rise to a position commensurate with his
ability and to remain in such a position throughout the remainder
of his career. This option is not available to naval officers,
except in a few cases and most of these are in senior ranks-
captain and above. The Navy's promotion policy of "promotion
up-or-out" terminates the careers of many officers before they
desire to leave the service. Additionally, except for factors
such as assignment to command billets and the receipt of
decorations, awards and commendations, promotion is the sole sign
of outward success for a military officer. As noted earlier,
promotion is highly important to the individual in our society—
to a naval officer this is especially true, for it usually




Most literature dealing with promotion criteria includes
considerable discussion on the roles of seniority and merit in
making promotion selections. As noted earlier, some present-day
writers stress that merit should be used as the main, if not
sole, criterion. Other authors note some advantages of senior-
ity, however, these "advantages" are often based on deficiencies
in promotion systems. Since the question of seniority vs. merit
forms the foundation of the discussion in the chapters which
follow, the advantages and disadvantages of each will now be
examined.
Seniority, simply stated, is "years of service." Expand-
ing this definition slightly as it applies to most military, and
some non-military, organizations, the definition becomes: "years
of service in present rank or grade."
Among the attributes of using seniority as the principal
criterion for promotion are the following:
1) Impartiality—which acts to eliminate charges of
favoritism on the part of candidates for promotion. Dale Yoder
notes that, in part, seniority Is used as a criterion "...
because objective measures of an employee's worth, contribution,
and potential are generally not available."*
2) Cultural basis, as set forth in the following excerpt
from the writings of Dale S. Beach:
Dale Yoder, Pers onne 1 Man agement and Indus t rl a 1
Relations (*»th ed. ; Englewood Cliffs. N. J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1556), p. 615.

Seniority fits in with the cultural expectations of
mankind. From primitive tribal society through modern
civilization greater benefits, status, respect and
privileges have accrued to older people.
1
3) Up to a certain point, employee proficiency increases
with length of service. However, the questionable value of
this advantage is noted in a discussion of seniority in govern-
ment organizations:
Overemphasis on "years of experience 11 still plagues many
agencies in their effort to achieve objectivity in
selections for promotions. Quite often the highly touted
"20 years of experience" is merely one year of experience
20 times. 2
4) Seniority acts to reward employees for "long and
faithful service."
The shortcomings of using seniority as the chief promo-
tion criterion are listed in abundance by present-day writers
in the field of personnel administration. The most often
mentioned are the following;
1) May result in unqualified people occupying important
positions, with a resultant deterioration of the whole organiza-
tion.
2) Weakens the incentive to excel in present job with
two-fold results; productivity is lowered and the retention
of talented, ambitious personnel is reduced.








It requires but a cursory examination of the above to
see that the limited advantages, attributed to seniority as a
promotion criterion, are highly debatable. On the other hand,
the disadvantages include potentially disastrous effects on an
organization.
Prior to discussion of merit as a promotion criterion,
a definition of the word as applied to promotion practices will
be established. Of the many texts and articles the author has
read on promotion practices, nearly all discuss "merit" in
laudatory terms without providing a suitable definition. Webster
defines "merit" as the "... quality of deserving well • • • •
worth; value; excellence • • • • something deserving reward,
-1
• •
." Based on this definition and the connotations derived
from various readings, the following will be used as a definition
of "promotions based on merit": "The policy of promoting, from
among the available candidates, those persons most deserving,
based on quality of performance in present and past positions,
and demonstrated ability and potential to assume the duties of
the higher-level positions."
The main advantages of good promotion systems, which
use merit as the chief criterion for selection, are:
1) Vacancies are filled with the best available people.
2) The stagnation of promotion opportunity, with its
attendant lowering of morale, is avoided when the opportunity
to reach the higher levels is an actuality.
webster'B New World Dictionary of the American




3) Increases the Incentive of employees to perform to
the limit of their abilities in present jobs, thus contributing
to the productivity of the organization.
4) Acts as an incentive for talented, ambitious employees
to remain with the organization resulting in a general upgrading
of personnel quality. 1
Providing a promotion system is wisely administered,
there appears to be no specific disadvantages in the use of
merit as the chief criterion in promotion selections. At least
two precautionary aspects of this policy have been set forth,
however. One of these deals with the avoidance of apparent
favoritism:
In principle almost all people agree that promotions
should be based on merit. Conflicts arise when promotions
are made on some basis that appears to be not on merit but
on favoritism.
2
The second aspect that bears attention is the degree of emphasis
placed on advancement:
Any program that overemphasizes the necessity for
"getting ahead" may only make employees feel a sense of
inadequacy and may eventually decrease their overall
usefulness. Here, as in so many fields, moderation is
the watchword.
3
From the preceding discussion of promotion criteria, it
should be apparent that merit best serves "... the good of the
service—-the ultimate criterion. "^ Secondly, seniority as a
^White, pp. 400-401; and Stahl, pp. 123-127.
p





promotion criterion Is perhaps best applied on a "when other
things are equal" basis,
A Criticism of the U. S. Navy Promotion System
During the past decade, the Navy f s promotion system has
received strong, sporadic criticism based on its failure to
retain talented young men as career naval officers. This
criticism has been aimed primarily at the limited opportunity for
outstanding: officers to advance at a more rapid rate than their
less-qualified contemporaries. The arguments of those who feel
a change in the system is necessary, if the Navy is to improve
its retention of highly-qualified young officers, is set forth
in the following:
Our promotion system does not permit us to recognize
adequately that officers develop at different rates,
depending on individual potential. The system provides
an arbitrary "normal" promotion schedule. ... It is a
conveyor belt, on which "we all grow old together". It
is the seniority system with selectivity at the promotion
point—not so much promotion selectivity as rejection
selectivity.
1
This particular criticism of the Navy's system is not directed at
the question of whether the "best fitted" are selected from among
those "in-zone" officers considered for promotion, but at the
limited "early selection" of outstanding officers.
Interest in this incentive and retention aspect of the
Navy promotion system has been strongly renewed by two current
developments. The first of these is revived Congressional
R. G. Alexander, LCDR, U. 3. Navy, and W, L. Read, LT,
U. S. Navy, "Let's Cet Rid of the Conveyor Belt!" United States
Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 83, No. 9 (September, 1957),
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interest in the Bolte Committee recommendations for amendment
of the Officer Personnel Act of 19*»7. The Bolte Committee
originally submitted its report of recommended changes five
years aero. This report proposes a wide range of officer career
legislation, including changes in the laws dealing with promo-
tions in all of the military services. Up to now, it has been
rejected by Congressional Committeemen chiefly because of its
complexity and bulk, A condensed "Baby Bolte" bill is being
prepared by the Department of Defense at the time of this
writing, 1
The second cause for renewed interest in promotion
opportunity is the recently completed work of the Navy's Reten-
tion Task Force. This group, established by the Secretary of
the Navy and headed by Pear Admiral John f*. Alford, recently
completed an extensive one and one-half year study encompassing
nearly every aspect of enlisted and officer personnel problems
in the Navy. The final report of this group's findings and
recommendations is in the process of publication at this time.
A revolutionary change to the present Navy promotion system is
recommended in this report.
^
The changes in the Navy promotion system that would
result from implementation of the recommendations of the Bolte
Committee and of the Alford Task Force will be examined in
Chapter IV of this paper.
*Navy Times (Fast Edition), January 26, 1966, p. 1.
p
Interview with a member of the Navy Retention Task




This paper will examine and evaluate the question of
whether or not the present promotion system of the U. S. Navy
provides sufficient opportunity for the outstanding young
officer to advance in rank at a more rapid rate than his less-
qualified contemporaries.
Scope of Problem
In the chapters which follow, the discussion is limited
to the promotion opportunity of unrestricted line officers of
the Regular Navy with assigned classification designation numbers
1100 (surface ship and submarine) and 1310 (aviation). The
complexities involved in the promotion of officers to flag rank
(above captain) further limits the scope of this paper to a
discussion of promotions up through the rank of captain.
No attempt will be made to quantitatively relate promo-
tion opportunity to retention. However, the promotion system
will be examined to evaluate the extent to which it rewards
outstanding performance and, in so doing, improves the attractive*
ness of a naval career to highly-qualified young officers.
Plan of Presentation
Since an understanding of the Navy's promotion system
is basic to the evaluation of any of the products of this system,
Chapter II will set forth the leaal and administrative framework
for the promotion of naval officers.
Chapter ITI will present statistics on promotion
opportunities for the ranks of lieutenant through captain for the
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past ten years (fiscal years 1957 through 1966). The data will
be analyzed and discussed to determine whether there has been
sufficient opportunity, in recent years, for promotion at a
rate faster than that of the "conveyor belt."
Recommendations for adjusting the promotion rate of
officers, based on relative performance and potential, will be
presented and evaluated in Chapter IV.
Conclusions will be set forth in Chapter V.

CHAPTER II
THE U. S. NAVY OFFICER PROMOTION SYSTEM
Objective
The basic objective of the naval officer promotion
system is to provide superior leadership to the Navy by insuring
"... that those who do reach the senior grades are the best
fitted to perform the military requirements of those grades and,
that they reach these grades at ages consistent with the military
requirements of the grades, . . .
Brief History
Before 1900, promotion in the Navy was solely by
seniority. The requirements were: Keep your digestion
in order and refrain from striking your superior officer.
The result was inevitable; all were promoted except those
who were notoriously too bad, and they had to be really bad.
Some few failed of promotion because of poor health, but
even that had to be pretty hopeless, 2
These strict seniority practices, when applied to the pyramidal
rank structure of the Navy, resulted in stagnation of promotions
and an officer corps of questionable quality. Additionally, most
officers were overage for the ^rade in which serving; those who
U, S,, Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Officer Fact Book (NAVPERS 15898), Change No, 9 of 29 June 1965,
Chap. 6, p, 6. Cited hereafter as Officer Fact Book ,
2Willlam S, Sims, Admiral, U, S, Navy (Ret.), "Promotion
by Selection," United States Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol, 60,




lived long enough to become admiral served only a 3hort time
—
one week to a few years—before reaching retirement age. 1
To correct the above deficiencies, in 1899, a board of
flag officers was instituted empowered to "select out" a
specified number of officers each year, such selections to be
confined to the grades above lieutenant (Junior grade). This
board became known as the "plucking board." This procedure of
"selection out" experienced growing unpopularity chiefly as a
result of the stigma attached to those officers "selected out." 2
The action of "plucking boards" was a somewhat effective,
although brutal, method of improving the quality of the naval
officer corps and providing for more reasonable promotion rates.
3
As a result of growing resentment against "selection
out", a "
. , . second regulatory measure was passed in 1916
and, if nothing more can be said of the plucking board, it must
be admitted that, through its very unpopularity, it gave us our
present (193*0 method of Selection up 1 ."^
The above actions of the Navy spearheaded the move away
from strict seniority promotions in the U. S. military services.
With minor modifications, such as changes in age-in-grade and
tirae-in-grade requirements, the promotion system used by the Navy
1Ibid
.
2 C, P. Brown, LT, U, S. Navy, "Promotion, Past and
Future," United States Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 60,
No. 2 (February, 193 jU, 159.
JSims. Unj ted States Naval Institute Proceedings
.
Vol. 60, No. 6, 769.
h
Brown, United States Naval Institute Proceedings
,
Vol. 60, No. 2, ToTT
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today—"selection up", based on selection board action—dates
back to 1916. X
The promotion of officers in the naval service today is
a product of three major inter-related factors. The first of
these is the legislative authorization for such action. The laws
governing the naval promotion system are contained in the Officer
Personnel Act (amended) of 19*17 which has been codified in
p
Title 10, U. S. Code. These laws establish the le^al framework
and broad guidelines for the operation of the other two factors—
the administrative actions of the Secretary of the Navy and the
actions of selection boards in determining which officers are
to be promoted.
The U. S. Navy Officer Corps
Rank structure
For the reader who is not familiar with the officer rank
structure within the Navy , the following are the ranks , in
ascending order, which will be discussed in this paper: ensign,
lieutenant (Junior parade), lieutenant, lieutenant commander,
commander, and captain. Official abbreviations of these may be
used in various parts of this paper; these are: ENS, LTJG, LT,
LCDR, CDR, and CAPT, respectively.
U. S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval
Personnel, "History of the U. S. Navy Promotion System"
(unpublished collection of articles and correspondence; in
files of the Bureau).
2Officer Fact Book. Chap. 6, p. 5.
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Temporary and permanent appointments
An explanation, at this point, of temporary and permanent
appointments, as utilized in the naval promotion system, will
aid in understanding much of the later discussion in this chapter,
Temporary appointments t All promotions of male officers
in the Navy are made by temporary appointments in the next higher
r;rade. Temporary appointments are made from approved promotion
lists, as vacancies in the temporary prade structure occur, after
selectees have met prescribed qualifications, or in the case of
ensijpns, when they become eligible for promotion upon the
expiration of the prescribed service in prade (currently,
eighteen months).
Permanent appointments ? These are not promotions in
rank. Permanent appointments are made from the temporary list,
by seniority, without selection board action, as vacancies occur
in the permanent grade structure of the Navy, A permanent
appointment usually laps a temporary appointment (to the same
rank) by several years. The permanent appointment bears the same
date of rank as the temporary, but has a later effective date;
pit does not affect either pay cr lineal list seniority.
Discussion of promotion in the Navy, applying the above
definitions, therefore refers solely to promotion to temporary
appointment in the next higher prade.
There is a significant difference between temporary and





A permanent appointment may not be revoked, suspended
or cancelled except by formal legal proceedings, A
temporary appointment may be terminated by the President
and an individual reverted to the parade of his permanent
appointment .... An officer does not normally serve in
a ^rade more than one higher than his permanent one.l
An example of this difference may be an aid to clarity: Assume
an officer is serving in the grade of lieutenant under a
permanent appointment to that grade. If he then is selected
for promotion to lieutenant commander, he is issued a temporary
appointment in this grade. While serving under this temporary
aopointment he may be reverted back to lieutenant by action of
the President of the United States. (This action is normally
taken only in cases of significant reductions in naval force).
However, once he has received his permanent appointment to
lieutenant commander, formal lepral proceedings are required if
this appointment is to be involuntarily terminated.
Authorized size and distribution of ranks
The authorized maximum number of active duty line
officers in the Regular Navy is equal to seven percent of the
authorized strength of the Regular Navy in enlisted personnel.
3
The permanent-grade distribution of line officers of the
Regular Navy is also controlled by law. The maximum percentage,
of the total number of such officers, that may be serving under
3U. S., Code (Annotated), Title 10, Sees. 5501-8010,
Armed Forces, Navy and Marine Corps (Brooklyn: Edward Thompson
Co., 1959), Sec. 5^03. Cited hereafter as USCfl , Title 10.
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permanent appointment In each grade, is as follows: 1
Flap: ranks (Admirals) 3/*% Lieutenant 2k 3/M
Captain 6 Lieutenant (junior grade)
Commander 12 and Ensign,
Lieutenant Commander 18 combined 38 1/2J5
Title 10 of the U. S. Code further regulates grade
distribution by prescribing the maximum number of officers who
may be serving in each of the ranks of lieutenant commander and
above. These prescribed numbers are based on the authorized
total number of line officers on active duty—Regular Navy and
Naval Feserve, including both temporary and permanent appointees
pin each rank.
Year groups . For purposes of promotion planning and a
wide variety of other administrative practices, officers of the
Navy are categorized into wyear groups". Officers, generally
speaking, are assigned to a year group based on the fiscal year
in which first commissioned.
Promotion Planning
Promotion control elements
Three promotion control elements are utilized in planning
for, and later execution of, naval officer promotions. These
three elements are: (1) Distribution, (2) Flow Pate, and
(3) Attrition, These control elements are closely interrelated
variables—a change in one changes one, or both, of the others,
3
A discussion of each of these elements will illustrate their
1
Tbid. , Sec. 5^7. 2Tbid . t Sec. 5^2.
^Officer Fact Book. Chap. 6, p. 6,
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use in promotion planning.
Distribution refers to the number of officers serving in
each rank. The Secretary of the Navy prescribes the distribution
of officers by parade, within the limits of law as noted above,
to meet the needs of the Navy. At least once each year, the
Secretary determines the number of officers serving in each of
the various grades. Vacancies in each prade—both known and ex-
pected—are determined for the coming fiscal year. This, in
turn, establishes the number of officers who may be promoted to
fill such vacancies in each grade. With distribution established,
flow rate and promotion attrition are determined to meet grade
requirements and best assure equality of promotion opportunity
for individuals in succeeding years.
Flow rate is the planned rate at which an officer will
progress through the various grades, providing he is successfully
selected for promotion to each higher grade, throughout the
course of his career. This rate is
. . .
determined by the military requirement of experience
coupled with the ohysical qualification demanded in each
of the successive grades. There is the additional require-
ment of the individual for advancement to avoid stagnation.
Stagnation would result in loss of incentive and determina-
tion.
3
Table 1, below, sets forth the flow rates, in terms of
years of service in crrade and cumulative years of service,
applicable to promotions in the Navy today. This table includes
prescribed and recommended years of service specified by law, as
1IMd.
, pp. 6-7. 2Ibid .. p. 7.
^Pay C, Needham, Pear Admiral, U. S. Navy, "Officer
Evaluation and Promotion," United States Naval Institute Proceed-
ings
.
Vol. 86, No. 3 (March, 1$60), 64.
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ni.mum years service in grade required to establish eligibility
for promotion to next higher grade
—
USCA , Title 10, Sec. 5751.
Years service in each grade re Lded by lav/—USCA, Title 10,
Sec. 5763.
Total years service, prior to promotion to next higher grade
commended by law—-USCA . Title 10, Sec. 57
"Actual years service in each grade based on promotion fit
in the Navy today—computed from "Total years service" column.
Actual total years service, prior to promotion to next higher
grade, characteristic of current Navy promotion practices—Officer Fact
Bock, Chap. 6, p. 180.

2k
well as actual present flow rate data.
Two aspects of the Information presented in Table 1
are particularly applicable to the problem under consideration
in this paper. First, it can be noted that both in terms of
years service in ,e;rade, and in total years service, the actual
promotion flow rate in the Navy today is more rapid than that
recommended by the Officer Personnel Act of 19*17. Rear Admiral
Ray C. Needham, while serving as Assistant Chief of Naval
Personnel for Personnel Control in I960, set forth the reason
for these differences:
The Chief of Naval Personnel believes that selection in
the eighteenth year to commander and at 25 years to captain
is too late to ret effective officers in those grades.
For that reason, a oolicy has been established that will
provide for selection for temporary promotion to lieutenant
commander in the tenth year, to commander in the sixteenth
year, and to captain in the 21st year of commissioned
service.
1
The second important aspect of Table 1 is the minimum
years-in-nrade requirements established by law. The differences,
between these minimum requirements and the current Navy flow
rate years-in-prade , establish the opportunity for early
promotion—" . . . the accelerated promotion of outstanding
officers whose performance indicates them to be definitely among:
the best fitted of all the officers in the rrade concerned."
The maximum promotion flow rate possible is a direct function of
the minimum time-in-prade requirements prescribed by law. No
officer may be considered for promotion to higher rrades prior
^Tbid
. , 67.
20ffleer Tact Book, Chap. 6, p. 7.
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to completing this minimum service, * This second aspect
—
statutory limits on promotion rates—is especially significant
to the problem under discussion and will be examined more
fully in later chapters.
Attrition , the third control element applied in the
promotion of naval officers, is defined as follows:
• . • a separation of officers from the service as a
result of death, legal action, or administrative action.
Attrition is a variable—the resultant of these factors.
It is not a true requirement, but functions to sustain
the requirements of distribution and flow rate.
2
Attrition is of two types: (1) natural, due to such factors
as deaths, resignations and voluntary retirements and,
(2) forced, due to involuntary separations or retirements result-
ing from failure of selection for promotion. 3 The necessity of
applying forced attrition is explained as follows:
Unless vacancies are created in higher grades, under
the grade limitation features of the law, advancement to
higher grades would be slowed to an unacceptable degree.
There must be some form of attrition if the command pyramid
and the concept of "up or out" is to be maintained. *•
Attrition should, in the words of one author, be Judiciously
administered, since:
Unnecessary attrition results in a waste of qualified
manpower and a loss of security of the individual. Attrition
rate should be the minimum consistent with established
values for distribution and flow rate.
5
XUSCA , Title 10, Sec. 5751.
2Needham. United States Naval Institute Proceedings ,
Vol. 86, No. 3, o*».
3pfficer Fact Book , Chap. 6, p. 9. ^Ibid.
^Needham, United States Naval Institute Proceedings ,
Vol. 86, No. 3, 64.
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Forced attrition is computed and applied, to each year's
promotions to the grades of lieutenant and above, to the extent
necessary to insure maintenance of a normal promotion flow
within the limits of grade distribution. To insure equal
opportunity to officers in succeeding year groups, forced attri-
tion is determined for each grade by a long range study which
projects promotions over a five-year period. The resulting
attrition percentage is then applied to the current year's
promotion in determining the number of officers who must be
placed in the promotion zone to be selected for vacancies for
the next fiscal year. The number of officers placed in the
promotion zone in excess of the number to be selected represents
the minimum number that must be failed of selection to provide
the percentage of forced attrition required by the long range
studies.
Promotion zones
U. S, Code, Title 10, requires the Secretary of the Navy
to establish a promotion zone, specifying the senior and Junior
officers ,therein, as of the date of convening a selection board
2
to consider officers of that grade for promotion. The size and
composition of this zone is as follows:
The size of a promotion zone is a function of known and
expected vacancies which will exist ... in the next higher
grade during the ensuing 12 months and the application of
the forced attrition variable. . . . Consequently the
promotion zone always consists of a number of those eligible
^Officer Fact Book . Chap. 6, p. 9.
2USCA. Title 10, Sec. 576*1.
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officers most senior in the grade under consideration who
have not previously been in a promotion zone to the next
higher grade. 1
Promotion eligibility
Officers eligible for consideration, by a selection
board, for promotion to the next higher grade, are of three
categories
:
1) " Above the Zone"—eligible officers who have been
previously considered for promotion from within a promotion
zone and who were not recommended for promotion by prior
selection boards.
2) "In the Zone"—a3 set forth above in the discussion
of promotion zones.
3) "Below the Zone"—-all eligible officers who have
fulfilled the minimum service-in-grade requirements, 2 but who
are not senior enough to be included within the promotion zone.
3
"Early promotions" refer to those made from this below-
the-zone category and renresent the sole means, under the present
oromotion system, whereby outstanding officers are Dromoted at a
more rapid rate than their contemporaries (who are not failed of
selection)
.
The term "failed of selection" is applied, to those
officers not recommended for promotion, as follows:
All officers in and above the promotion zone who are
not recommended for promotion to the next higher grade by a
^-Qffleer Fact Book , Chan. 6, pp. 14-15.
p
Above, Table 1.
^Officer Fact Book, Chan. 6, p* 15.
'
28
selection board are failed of selection. Those elieribles





Selection boards for the promotion of naval officers
are appointed and convened annually by the Secretary of the Navy.
Separate boards are appointed for the promotion of officers to
each oT the grades of lieutenant through rear admiral.
Except in the Medical and Dental Corps, no officer
may be promoted above the rank of lieutenant (junior grade)
without having been recommended for such promotion by a
duly constituted and convened selection board.
. .
,2
Temporary promotion to the rank of lieutenant (junior grade) is
currently made by administrative action upon completion of
eighteen months satisfactory service as an ensign and determina-




Naval officer selection boards are composed of nine
members. Title 10, U. S. Code, specifies minimum grade require-
ments for membership on such boards. These minimum requirements
are as follows
:
1) For selection to the rank of captain—all board
members must be servinr in the grade of rear admiral or above.
2) For selection of lieutenant commanders to the rank




. , p. 17.
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3) For selections to the ranks of lieutenant commander
and lieutenant—members must be in the grade of captain or
above. 1
An officer cannot serve as a member of two consecutive






The Secretary of the Navy Is required by law to furnish
prescribed Information to boards convened for the selection of
officers for promotion. This includes the number, and names,
of all officers eligible for consideration by the board. * The
Secretary must also specify the number of officers the board
is to select for promotion:
This number, determined by the Secretary as of the date
the board is convened, is equal to the number of vacancies
existing among such officers in the higher grade, plus
the number of additional vacancies estimated for the next
12 months, minus the number of officers on the [temporary]
promotion list for that grade. 1*
Promotion criteria
Title 10, U. S. Code, sets forth the criteria to be used
by selection boards in the following terms:
^•USCA . Title 10, Sec. 5701.
Officer Fact Book . Chap. 6, p. 15.




Of the officers considered for promotion . • , , the
board shall recommend for promotion, as appropriate • • •
Those eligible male officers on the active list in
the line of the Navy • • • whom the board considers best
fitted for promotion;!
The meaning of "best fitted" is discussed later in this chapter.
Provision for "early selections"
The maximum percentage of those who may be selected
from below the zone for early promotion, thus rewarding the
performance of outstanding officers junior to the zone, is stated
in law as follows t
From among those eligible officers . . . who are Junior
in lineal rank to the Junior officer in the appropriate
promotion zone in any grade below that of captain in the
Navy • • . , the board may recommend as best fitted for
promotion a number of officers that does not exceed 5 percent
of the total number of officers that the board is authorized
to recommend for promotion to the parade concerned . • . .2
Since promotion to lieutenant (Junior grade) is an
administrative procedure, this 5 percent limit applies to early
promotions to the grade of lieutenant through captain. There
are no statutory limits on be low-the- zone selections to flag
ranks.
Votes required for selection
Promotion statutes also prescribe the minimum affirmative
votes required for recommendation of an officer for promotion:
No officer may be recommended for promotion • • • unless
he receives the recommendation of at least two-thirds of the
acting members of the board concerned.
3
^•USCA, Title 10, Sec. 5707 (a).
2Ibid. , Sec. 5707 (c).





No rules are prescribed on the detailed procedures to
be followed by a selection board in the selection process.
Deliberations cannot be revealed and members are sworn to
secrecy. Therefore, it is never possible to give concrete
reasons why an individual was selected or not selected.
1
Although records of procedures and deliberations of a particular
board are not available due to the above secrecy requirements,
naval officers who have had selection board experience have
written articles concerning the proceedings of a "typical"
selection board. Some of these articles are used in the dis-
cussion which follows.
When the board first meets in Washington, the Chief of
Naval Personnel and members of his staff make a series of
presentations to the board. These briefings are oriented to the
present and future needs of the Navy and provide broad guide-
lines for the board to follow in the selection process. Follow-
ing this, the board is formally convened—members and recorders
are placed on their oath to perform their duties to the best of
their ability. The precept—a letter to the president of the
board from the Secretary of the Navy—is then read. The precept
sets forth in precise terms:
• • • Which officers are in the promotion zone; it indicates
the number of eligible officers whom the board may look at
above the zone; and it further specifies the [maximum]
number of people who can be selected for "head and shoulders"
early selection. 2
Officer Fact Book . Chap. 6, p. 15.
Fitzhugh Lee, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, "Selection for
Promotion," The Officer Personnel Newsletter . Vol. 10, No. 1




Following the above preliminaries, the board then decides what
specific criteria to use in determining " • • • those officers
who are •best fitted'—who have the greatest future potential—
for service in the next grade." 1 Each selection board is
essentially a free agent to conduct its affairs as it sees fit
regarding:
1) The methods by which the board will arrive at its
decisions,
2) The weights which it will give to the factors in the
officers 1 records it reviews, and
3) The manner of voting.
Determination of "best fitted"
Based on extensive readings which discuss "best fitted",
the following definition of this overall criterion for promotion
may be formulated: " 'Best fitted' describes those officers who
demonstrate the greatest potential for meeting the present and
future needs of the service in the next higher grade."
The determination of best fitted for promotion is based
primarily on performance in past and present positions, and
demonstrated potential, as indicated on an officer's fitness
reports (written performance reports) received throughout his
career. Many other factors, such as education and receipt of




2Worth Scanland, Captain, U, S, Navy. "Standby . . .
Vote," United States Naval Institute Proceedings . Vol. 89.
No. 6* (June, W63J, «.
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however, evaluated performance and potential are the dominant
factors.
Evaluation of records
To facilitate the evaluation of officers for selection,
brief sheets are prepared on each eligible candidate. These
briefs, a few pages in length, summarize the officer's entire
career including marks received on selected items of his fitness
reports. The evaluation of these briefs, particularly the fitness
report marks, play a key role in the selection process. In
evaluating past performance, the fitness report marks are
tempered with the following factors:
1) Position held when marks were received—responsibility
of position relative to rank held at the time.
2) Employment of command--at sea, ashore, in drydock,
and the like.
3) Agreement between sections—comparison of marks in
"forced-choice 1* boxes with narrative description of performance.
**) Allowance for known high, or low, graders among those
who have submitted the reports.
^
Voting
As noted earlier, in order to be recommended for
promotion, an officer must receive the affirmative vote of six




3.Tack E. Mapree, LT, U. S. Navy, "For Those Pacing Selec-
tion," United States Naval Institute Proceedings . Vol. 84, No. 11
(November, 14585, 75-7 1*.

3*
(two-thirds) of the board members. Details of typical voting
procedures are not within the scope of this paper, however, the
following two excerpts from articles concerning "typical" board
procedures are concerned appropriate:
A typical procedure is to first examine the records of
officers who are in the zone for promotion (first time up
for selection), then go to those above the zone (passed
over once or more), and finally to consider those below the
zone to identify the small number of "head and shoulders"
men who can be selected for accelerated promotion.
1
And secondly: After selecting the allowed percentage in and
above the zone,
Then comes the task of selecting, if warranted, some
officers from below the zone whose records show them to
be so superior and of such potential that accelerated
promotion is in the best interests of the Navy.
From the 1,000 records of those below the zone who are
eligible, a count is made of those who received a unanimous
vote of the board.
2
Those quotations are set forth to illustrate the stringent
requirements for early selection as established by two "typical"
selection boards. To what extent these examples are indicative
of general Navy promotion practices will be examined in Chapter
III.
Actions Based on Selection Board Results
Officers twice "failed of selection"
Regular Navy officers serving under permanent appoint-
ments in the ranks of lieutenant (junior grade) and lieutenant
Le«» The Officer Personnel Newsletter , Vol. 10,
No. 1, 17.
2Scanland, United States Naval Institute Proceedings
,
Vol. 89, No. 6, 46.
-
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who are twice failed of selection to the next higher grade are
honorably discharged from the Navy, with lump sum severance pay,
on the last day of the fiscal year in which the second failure
occurs.
Lieutenant commanders, commanders and captains who are
twice failed of selection continue to serve in grade and remain
eligible for promotion consideration by subsequent selection
boards. If not promoted, such officers are involuntarily
retired upon comDletion of 20 years service in the case of
lieutenant commanders; 26 years for commanders; and 30 years for
captains. 2 In recent years, commanders and captains have been
subject to earlier involuntary retirement under the provisions
of PL 86-155, commonly known as the "Hump Bill". In these cases,
commanders are retired upon completion of 20 years service if
twice failed of selection and not selected for continuation on
active duty; captains are retired after five years in grade and
non-selection for continuation.
Officers selected for promotion
Upon completion of its deliberations, the selection board
prepares a list of the officers it has found best fitted for
promotion to the next higher grade. The principal actions
involved, between submission of the selection board's report
and temporary promotion of the officers concerned, are as follows:
Officer Fact Book . Chap. 6, pp. 17-18.
2
USCA, Title 10, Sees. 6376, 6379-6380.
^Officer Fact Book. Chap. 6, p. 18,
•
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1) Nominations are sent, via the Chief of Naval
Personnel, Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary of the Navy
and Secretary of Defense, to the President for approval.
2) Nominations are sent to the Senate for confirmation.
3) Selected officers are placed on the promotion list,
for the appropriate grade, in the same order as their
seniority in present grade.
4) Upon existence of a vacancy in the temporary grade
structure of the rank concerned, a temporary appointment, signed
by the Secretary of the Navy, is sent to the senior officer on
the promotion list. The date of the vacancy determines the
date of rank of the temporary appointment.
5) Providing the officer accepts the promotion and has
previously met prescribed qualifications, he is temporarily







PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
General
Tables 2 through 5, below, show statistics for promo-
tions to the ranks of lieutenant through captain, for fiscal
years 1957 through 1966. These data are limited to unrestricted
line officers of the Pegular Navy with a classification designa-
tion number of 1100 or 1310. To facilitate analysis, data for
each rank are tabulated for each annual selection board,
subtotaled by designation numbers, and subsequently totaled.
The tables contain statistics for each of the three promotion
eligibility catetrorie3. Only the total numbers of selectees are
tabulated for above-the-zone and below-the-zone categories, since
the numbers of officers eligible for promotion in these cate-
gories is not considered germane to this discussion. Data
relative to officers in the promotion zone include the number
eligible and the number, and percentage, of these officers
selected. The percentage of in-zone selections is considered
pertinent for purposes of comparison with the percentage of
selections which were made from below the zone.
The following explanations and limitations, relative to
the interpretation of the tabulated data, are applicable:




to a given rank may vary greatly over a period of years. These
variations are due to a number of factors which are beyond the
scope of this paper to examine; however, this fact should be
kept in mind when ten-year averages of the various data are
presented in the discussion below.
2) The promotions to a given rank, in a particular year,
for 1100 and 1310 officers result from the recommendations of a
single promotion board. The promotions are separated, by
classification designation number, only as an aid to analysis.
3) The data relative to the promotion of aviators prior
to 1963 include a small percentage of aviation line officers
with designation numbers other than 1310. Separate data for
1310 officers for fiscal years 1957 through 1962 were not
readily available. This factor is considered to have negligible
effect on the problem under discussion.
4) In a few cases it may be noted that below-the-zone
promotions exceed five-percent (the statutory limit) for annual
promotions in a particular classification designation. The same
selection boards, which consider 1100 and 1310 officers for
promotion, also consider Naval Reserve officers on active duty
and several other classifications of Regular Navy officers. The
five-percent limit applies to the total number of selections
made by a particular board, thus early promotions for one or more
specific groups (by designation number) may exceed five percent
providing that the total does not exceed this statutory limit.
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E 2.—Promotion of Unrestricted Line Officers of the Regular Navy to







Des. No. ':. Pet. of
Fiscal Sel. .ig. Sel.
;
1. - JL» Sel. Tot. Sel.
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1100 ,
1957 7 626 607 l 97.0 1 0.2
55 9 520 515 99.0 1 525 0.2
59 1 549 95.3 o 550 0.0
60 8 642 609
! 94.9 617 0.0
61 14 752 71. 94.8
, 1 723 0.1
62 20 774 731 ! 94.4 1JL 752 0.1
63 12 826 784
; 94.9 9 1.1
64 12 97.2 0.0
65 2 1142 1079 94.5 2 33 .0.2







95.3 15 785S 0.2
i2io
1957 3 451 1 99.6
-
- 455 0.2
53 3 584 581
|
99.5 2 0.3
59 1 581 579 .7 0.0
60 1 532 524
;
1.5 525 0.0
61 7 557 556 99.3 1 564 0.2
62 1 627 621 ,' 99.0 1 623 0.2
63 5 355 353 ! 99.2 o 0.0
64 2 329 326
j
99.1 328 0.0




2 366 361 i -93.6 35- 0.0
26 4684 4645 99.2 5 4676 0.1







1. Abbreviations used: Class. D ,—Classification
.r; Sel.—Selected; Elig.—Nligible; Pet.—Percent;
2. Column (6) is a total of columns (l), (3) and (5).
3. Sources: Columns (l) through (6)—Bureau of Naval P>:
:
Column (7), sub-totals and totals—computed by author.
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3 3.—Promotion of Unrestricted Line Officers of : to the
Rank of Lieutenant Commander, Fiscal Years 1957-1;
Class.
,
Above Below Total one
Des. No. Zone Zone Pet. .
Fiscal Sel. Sel. Sel. -1. Sel. Tot
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1100
1957 3 572 506 88.5 19 528 3.6
58 7 649 80.7 o 656 0.0
59 28 354 293 82.8 321 0.0
60 32 237 235 81.9 267 0.0
61 34 391 365 93.4 16 415
62- 3 441 422 95.7 25 450 5.6
63 5 689 634 92.0 11 650 1.7
64 12 447 85.0 33 425 7.8
65 27 416
.
376 90.4 12 415 2.9
66 3 1178 1037 88.0 10 1050 1.0
Sub-tot
.
154 5579 4S97 87.3 126 5177 2.4
i2io
1957 8 474 438 92.4 9 455 2.0
58 7 864 729 84.4 0.0
59 34 675 543 81.2 5 0.0
60 82 541 493 92.0 580 0.0
61 34 357 352 93.6 10 396 2.5
62 1 414 403 97.3 17 421 4.0
63 936 897 95.8 6 S03 0.7
64 8 733 677 91.7 24 709
65 19 625 597 95.5 14 2.2
66 9 902 857 96.1 6 0.7
Sub-tot 202 6526 6006 92.0 86 6294 1.4






1. Abbreviations used: Class. Des. No.—Classification ation
Number; Sel.—Selected; Elig.—Eligible; Pet.—Percent;
2. Column (6) is a total of columns (l), (3) and (5).
3. Sources: Columns (l) through (6)—Bureau of Naval Personnel fi.
Column (7), sub-totals and totals—computed by author.
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TABLE 4.—Promotion of Unrestricted Line Officers of the Regular Wavy to












Fiscal Sel. Elig. Se Sel. Sel. Sel. Tot. Sel.
Year (i) (2) (3) ! (4) (5) (6) (7)
1100
1957 11 63 51
!
81.0 6 63 8.3
58 9 273 233
\
85.3 242 0*0
59 1 . 317 180
:
56.8 4 185 2.2
60 20 404 232
j
57.4 3 255 1.2
61 15 434 277 j 63.3 2 294 0.7
62 39 358 263
i
71.5 5 307 1.6
63 13 390 250 66.7 4 282
64 12 302 228 75.5 3 243
65 24 271 184 67.9 7 215 -
66
Sub-tot
4 G07 457 i 75.2 5 1.1
153 3429 2365 ; 69.1 39 2557 1.5
1310
1957 28 177 141 79.7 6 175 3.4
58 20 415 329
j
79.3 349 0.0
59 1 685 305 ! 44.5 4 310 1.3
60 34 616 307 ! 49.3 2 343 0.6
61 34 482 234 53.9 3 321 0.9
62 56 413 273
j
66.1 3 332 0.9
63 25 361 247
j
63.4 4 276 1.4
64 13 576 412 j 71.5 2 427 0.5






71.0 5 441 1.1
270 4902 3130
j
63.9 34 3434 1.0
i iii
423 8331 5495 ! 66.0 73 1.2
!
Notes:
1. Abbreviations used: Class. Ces. I.o.—Classification Dc~
dumber; Sel.—Selected; Elig*—Eligible; Pet.—Percentage.
2. Column (6) is a total of columns (l), (3) and (5).
3. Sources: Columns (l) through (6)—Bureau of Naval Perso.
Column (7), sub-totals and totals—computed by author.
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£ 5.—Promotion of Unrestricted Line Officers of the Regular Navy to









Des. No. No. • Pet. Pet. of
s oal Sel. Sel. Sel. Sel. Sel. Tot
.
Year (1) (2) (5) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1100
1957 7 140 87 62.1 8 102 7.S
58 5 186 103 55.4 6 112 5.4
59 4 551 154 46.5 2 160 1.2
60 55 286 122 42.7 5 162 3.1
61 15 261 130 49.8 4 147 2.7
62 20 218 116 53.2 1 157 0.7
65 29 144 65 45.1 9 103
64 14 228 112 49.1 4 130 3.1
65 13 547 167 3.1 5 183 1.6
66 8 272 126 46.5 6 140 • 4.3
Sub-tot. 151 2415 1182 49.2 48 1381 5.5
1110
1957 5 149 104 69.8 5 112 4.5
58 5 84 56 66.7 5 64
59 5 576 164 45.6 2 169 1.2
60 22 558 ICO 27.9 5 125 2.4
61 22 572 112 30.1 2 136
62 15 589 112 28.8 5 123 2.3
65 46 452 102 25.6 5 153 3.5
64 25 550 116 53.1 4 145 2.8
65 25 526 195 57.1 2 220 0.9
66 20 545 119 54.6 5 142 2.1
Sub-tot
.
ISO 5581 1180 54.9 54 1394 2.4
Totals 551 5794
>
2362 40.8 82 2775 3.0
Notes
:
1. Abbreviations used: Class. Des. No.—Classification on
Number; Sel.—Selected; Elig.—Eligible; Pet.—Percentage.
2. Column (o) is a total of columns (l), (5) and (5).
5. Sources: Columns (l) through (6)—Bureau of Naval Personnel files.
Column (7), sub-totals and totals—computed oy author.
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The data fron Tables 2 through 5 are discussed and
analyzed below for the purpose of illustrating opportunity, or
lack of opportunity, for early promotions in the Navy during the
past ten years. Explanations which may account for specific
early promotion rates will be noted in the discussion.
Promotion Opportunities
To the rank of lieutenant
Data for promotions to the rank of lieutenant are
tabulated in Table 2. The most significant facts set forth by
this table are: (1) the very high percentage of in-zone officers
promoted and, (2) the very low percentage of below-the-zone
(early) promotions.
The ten-year average of promotion opportunity for
officers in the zone was 95.3 percent for 1100 officers (surface
and submarine); and 99.2 percent for 1310 officers (aviators).
Percentages for each of the years during this period did not vary
significantly from these averages. The primary reason for these
high promotion rates is apparently the severe shortage of offi-
cers in this rank. For example, the fiscal 1967 estimated Navy
needs for unrestricted line lieutenants is l6,175 # while the
number on board as of November 30, 1965 was only 10,723. The
shortage in this rank is greater—in number and in percentage
—
than for any other rank in the Navy. 1
With such high in-zone promotion rates, one might
expect that below the zone promotions would have been made in




significant numbers. However, combined 1100-1310 early promo-
tions were only a token 0,2 percent of total promotions over the
ten-year period. This negligible number of early promotions is
explainable, especially for the past two years, on the basis of
the minimum total service required before promotion to lieutenant
can be effected—three and one-half years (18 months service as
ensign plus two years statutory minimum time-in-grade as
lieutenant, Junior grade). The following, concerning promotions
for fiscal year 1966, illustrates this point:
The . . . male J ay gees picked for promotion to lieutenant
will make their numbers 3 1/2 years after their date of
commissioning.
This is about what occurred last Farch when there were
vacancies for all, despite the earlier direction that the
fiscal 1965 selectees make their numbers on their fourth
anniversary.
1
At the present time, therefore, promotion opportunity to
lieutenant is very high due to a shortage of officers in this
grade. Opportunity for early promotion to this grade is
currently (FY 1966) non-existent since promotion of all selectees
is being effected upon completion of the minimum term of service.
Early promotion to this grade in less recent years meant a
maximum of six-months acceleration in promotion, relative to
contemporaries, since the normal Navy flow rate for promotion
was four years, or .just six months longer than the prescribed
minimum.
For the present time at least, a meaningful discussion
of early promotions must begin at the lieutenant commander level.
1 «Ibid., December 8, 1965, P. 5.
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To the rank of lieutenant commander
Promotion statistics relative to this rank are presented
in Table 3. As one would expect with a pyramidal rank structure,
promotion opportunity decreases with increasing levels of rank.
The ten-year in-zone average for 1100 officers was 87.8 percent;
for 1310 officers, 92.0. The maximum deviation of Individual
annual percentages from these averages was slightly over 10
percent. The overall 1100-1310 promotion rate for in-zone
officers was 90.0 durincr this period. This small decrease in
promotion opportunity, relative to that for lieutenants, was
accompanied by a slight increase in the early promotion rate—
2,4 percent for 1100 officers, 1,4 percent for 1310 officers,
for an overall below-zone selection rate of 1.8 percent. The
picture here changed but slightly from that of the next lower
rank. Promotion opportunity was still high and early promotions
remained few in number—about 20 per year average for 1100 and
1310 officers combined.
At this promotion point, there are approximately two
years available In which early promotions may be made. This
"slack" is due to the difference between normal Navy flow rate
to this grade (ten years total service) and statutory limits
(eight years, assuming the "normal" rate of four years to
lieutenant plus the statutory minimum of four years service In
that grade).
To the rank of commander
As shown in Table 4, the trend of decreasing promotion
opportunity with Increasing rank continues. This table shows the
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ten-year average in-zone promotion opportunity to the rank of
commander was 69.1 percent for surface and submarine officers,
and 63.9 percent for aviators. Contrary to the previous ranks
discussed, the individual annual averages vary considerably from
the ten-year averages. The maximum deviation is nearly 20 percen«
tape points (fiscal year 1959 for 1310 officers). The greater
fluctuation here is chiefly due to the latter part of the World
War II "hump" of officers passing through this rank during this
ten-year period. The combined 1100-1310 in-zone promotion rate
for this period was 66.0 percent, with a combined average early
selection rate of 1.2 percent, slightly lower than It was for
lieutenant commanders.
Assuming an officer is promoted to lieutenant commander
at the present planned flow rate of 10 years total service, there
Is only one year available in which accelerated promotion to
commander can be effected. This year represents the difference
between the Navy desired flow rate of five years service in the
grade of lieutenant commander, and the corresponding statutory
minimum time-in-grade of four years.
To the rank of captain
Table 5 tabulates data relative to promotions to the
rank of captain. Compared to the lower ranks discussed above,
the promotion picture for this rank has been considerably
different—much lower in-zone promotion rates accompanied by
higher rates of early selection.
The in-zone rate for 1100 officers was 49.2 percent;
for aviators, 34.9; with a combined ten-year rate of 40.8

*»7
percent. These relative low promotion rates further reflect the
pyramidal characteristic of the Navy officer corps. Combined
with this factor, low promotion rates (high attrition) have
resulted from the World War II officer "hump" being considered
for promotion to captain throughout most of this ten-year period.
The combined 1100-1310 early promotion rate for this
grade was 3.0 percent, still a small percentage but a significant
increase above the rates for lower grades. This increase in
early promotion rate, despite the decrease in the promotion rates
for officers in the zone, is partially explainable in terms of
total years service on which evaluation for selection is based.
For example, it seems reasonable to assume that more sound early
selections can be made when based on the evaluation of approxi-
mately 20 years total service (selection to captain) than when
only 10 years service (selection to lieutenant commander) are
evaluated.
Present desired Navy flow rate to captain is based on
six years service in grade as a commander. The corresponding
statutory limit is five years minimum service in grade. This
allows, as in the case of promotion to commander, an opportunity
for a one-year acceleration in promotion.
Normal, Early, and Late Promotions
It may be argued that more outstanding officers are
promoted faster than their less-qualified contemporaries when
outstanding officers are promoted "when due w (in the zone for
the first time), while some of the less-qualified are promoted
after beim? failed of selection one or more times. This seems to
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be a negative approach to the problem under discussion. How-
ever, the percentages of promotions from each category—late
(above-zone), normal (ln-zone), and early (below-zone)—will be
briefly examined. Table 6 shows the number, and percent of
total selections, of promotions made from each of these
categories.
TABLE 6.—Promotion of Unrestricted Line Officers (1100 & 1310)
of the Pegular Navy by Zone Categories, Fiscal Years 1957-1966 a
Promotion to Total No.
Selected
Above Zone, In Zone Below Zone

































Totals 32,769 123" 3.8 31,148 95.0 387 1.2
aTotal numbers selected, and nos. by category, are taken
from Tables 2 through 5.
Pet. refers to the percentage of the total number
selected. Pct.'s for the three categories may not total 100.0
percent due to rounding.
Peference to the above table illustrates that the overall
readjustment of seniority as a result of late promotions has been
relatively small— 3.8 percent for total promotions of the past
ten years. It is noted, however, that the percentage of late
promotions increases with increase in rank— from 1.0 percent for
lieutenants to a significant rate of 11.9 percent for captains.
This increase is accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the
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percentage of total promotions which are made from within
promotion zones
—
98.8 percent for lieutenants decreasing to 85.
for captains. This interrelationship is simply a function of
mathematics—with the number of promotions fixed, any increase
in promotions from one zone category must result in a decrease
in one or both of the other categories.
Table 6 shows that a great percentage of all promotions
have been made from within promotion zones, with a small
percentage of above-zone promotions and an even smaller percent-
age of below-zone selections, thus providing little readjustment
of seniority among all officers who are successfully promoted
to any given rank.
Summary
The foregoing examination of the promotion of unrestricted
line officers of the Regular Navy produces the following major
points pertinent to early promotion opportunity:
1) Although a five percent rate of early selection is
allowed under law, the early promotion rates for most grades have
been far below this limit. Early promotion to the rank of
captain, at an average rate of 3.0 percent, is the single
exception to this.
2) Except in the case of promotions to captain, the
combined effects of early and late promotions provided little
readjustment of seniority among officers successfully selected,
regardless of when selection occurred.
3) Perhaps the most significant result of an examination
of the data in Tables 2 through 5 is a realization of the
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autonomy of individual selection boards. As noted earlier in
this paper, within the guidelines presented in preliminary
briefings and the Secretary of the Navy*s precept, a promotion
board acts as a "free agent" in selection of the best-fitted.
The data in the tables reenforce this stated feature of the Navy
promotion system. As a result, it is difficult to note any
trends or arrive at any generalizations, concerning promotions,
based on the data in the tables. For example, even with the
interdependence of the variables involved, it seems reasonable
to assume that both above-, and be low-zone promotions would be
proportional to the in-zone promotion rates. That is, as a
higher percentage of officers are promoted from within the zone,
it is reasonable to believe that increasing numbers of above-,
and below-zone officers would better fulfill the criterion of
best-fitted compared to the least-qualified who are promoted
from within the zone. This generalization, which assumes a
normal distribution of talent within each year group, cannot be
supported by the data. In fact, several cases of the reverse
of this may be found.
4) One factor, not previously mentioned, is worthy of
note at this point. The total number of individual officers
who have realized at least one early promotion in the past ten
years is less than the total of early selections to all grades—
387, from Table 6—to the extent that some of these officers may
have received more than one early promotion. For example, an
exceptionally outstanding lieutenant selected early for promotion
to lieutenant commander in 1957, could possibly have been
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selected early, for commander in 1961, and a^ain for captain
In 1966. Information on such early-pronotion "repeaters"
was not readily available.

CHAPTER TV
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE NAVY PROMOTION SYSTEM
General
The relative lack of opportunity for officers to advance
more rapidly than the strict framework of seniority allows has
not gone unnoticed. Particularly in recent years, various
administrative or statutory changes to the Navy promotion system
have been proposed aimed at rectifying this deficiency. This
problem area has been set forth by Rear Admiral C, K. Duncan,
U. S. Navy, as follows:
In no other phase of U. S. life is seniority so embedded
as it is in the U. S. Navy. A seniority system is an
absolute necessity in any military organization .... We
need seniority, however, only among a group of individuals
in a specific situation at a given time. The relative
seniority between cruiser skippers in i960 does not
necessarily have to be that which was established in
classrooms in 1935.
The concept which many have that a class should march
into the Naval Academy together in July, march out four
years later in a seniority list determined in an under-
graduate atmosphere , and then march out of the Navy in a
body 30 years later in exactly the same precedence, goes
counter to other experience with human nature.
1
The above excerpt, of course, does not take into account
officers who are failed of selection, or who are early selected,
one or more times during the course of their naval careers.
Three proposed changes which might improve the opportunity
C. K. Duncan, Pear Admiral, U. S. Navy, "Comment and
Discussion: U. S. Naval Seniority Practices," United States
Naval Institute Proceedings
.





for early promotion will be briefly examined in this chapter.
Potential benefits and shortcomings of each will be presented
where applicable. These three proposed changes are:
1) Periodic realignment of lineal list seniority.
2) Implementation of certain changes recommended by
the Bolte Committee.
3) Adoption of the distributed-zone promotion system
developed by the Navy Retention Task Force.
Periodic Realignment of Lineal List Seniority
In 1961, the Chief of Naval Personnel proposed that a
periodic realignment of seniority, within designated blocks or
groups of officers, be conducted throughout the career span of
naval officers. The concept behind such a realignment procedure
is noted by one author as follows:
It would seem that class or year-group, within a two-to-
three-year span, is not a factor in determining competence
after some six or seven years 1 service, although its use
during the early years is logical and, in fact, inescapable .
• • • This initial ranking should undergo review, however,
no later than the time of promotion from lieutenant to
lieutenant commander.!
This same author envisioned that a procedure for
realignment of seniority would operate generally along the
following lines:
A system of periodic (at promotion eligibility points)
revision of the precedence list in groups extending over
about three classes [year groups] would avoid the rigidity
of original seniority established by class or class
standing .... There are several ways to rearrange
seniority through the years • • • • Rearrangement of every
individual's precedence in relation to every other's need





majority, relative to one another, would probably not be
changed, but the precedence of the best and poorest
performers would be changed. Seniority change would be
permissive on the part of the Board rather than compulsory,*
Potential benefits of realignment
The potential benefits of seniority realignment have
been set forth by one naval officer as follows:
1) Provides for better performers to gravitate upwards.
2) Gives the individual officer a periodic check on
the evaluation of his performance relative to his contemporaries,
3) Provides performance incentive to a wider range of
officers than does early selection,
ft) Acts as an aid in detailing officers to "pre-selec-
tion" billets, (Selection for certain career-enhancing Jobs,
both Navy-wide and within individual organizations, is often
based on seniority), 2
Fealignment of lineal list seniority should produce the
above-listed benefits, however, its effect on the actual promo-
tion rate of more outstanding officers would depend on the
extent to which realignment accelerated the entrance of such
officers into later promotion zones. If conducted in increments
of over one year group, such acceleration would be achieved.
Difficulty of realignment
The primary difficulty in conducting an objective
1Tbid. , 105.
2S, Turner, LCDP, U, S, Navy, "Comment and Discussion,"




realignment of seniority, which would enjoy the confidence of
officers whose careers are affected by such a procedure, lies
in weaknesses inherent in a basic element of the entire naval
promotion system—fitness reports. Since shortcomings of the
fitness reports system are applicable to later discussion also,
a brief examination of this system will be presented at this
point.
The most prevalent criticisms of fitness reports are
that overall grading is generally too high and that there is
such a degree of uniformity among reports that evaluation of
actual performance is difficult. A few comments, made by senior
naval officers, illustrate this point:
Too many officers are being marked straight down the line
as "outstanding," "one of the highly outstanding officers
T know" and "1 out of a 100" with general and superlative
comments.
If you mark two or more competing officers as "one of highly
outstanding," you should indicate which is your best
performer and, insofar as possible, the relative standing
of the others.
1
When the marks were analyzed over a period of time, too many
officers were rated outstanding.
Given 100 fitness report Jackets, one could readily select
the top ten and the bottom ten; but it would be difficult
to select the ten ranking from ^5 to 55 inclusive.
2
So many records are so similar in so many respects that,
from a list of 100 officers of which only 40 can be selected,
it is easy to pick the top 30 and the bottom 30 officers.
B, J, SemmeB , Jr., Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of
Naval Personnel, "From the Chief of Naval Personnel,"
The Officer Personnel Newsletter . Vol. 10, No. 3 (January, 1966),
p. 1.
2Hay C. Needham, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, "Officer
Evaluation and Promotion," United States Naval Institute
Proceedings. Vol. 86, No. 3 Cl^arch, 19b0), bl-b2.
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But to get the 10 remaining selectees from the 40 officers
left in the middle is most difficult.
1
A comment written in 1934 by Admiral Sims illustrates that this
problem is not unique to the present-day Navy:
This impossibility of determining the relative fitness
of officers is due to the well-known fact that reports of
fitness are practically uniform, and are generally much
too favorable,
2
Prom the above comments
,
one may deduce that realignment
of a particular year group is possible to the extent that the
top 10-30 percent could be advanced on the seniority list and
another 10-30 percent realigned to the lower end of the list.
As the block, in which realignment is to be effected, spans
greater periods of time (more year groups) the task becomes
increasingly difficult and complex. Whether realignment of
seniority, especially in blocks of over one year group, could
be administered so as to enjoy the confidence of those whose
careers it affects, appears highly questionable in view of the
shortcomings of the fitness report system of evaluation.
Despite the weaknesses of fitness reports, there appears
to be no mechanism presently available that would better serve
as a basis for performance evaluation, particularly when one
considers the size of the naval organization. A non-military
writer has noted the importance of such reports, in large
^Fitzhugh Lee, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, "Selection for
Promotion," The Offleer Personnel Newsletter . Vol. 10, No. 1
(July, 1965), 17. Reprinted from the Parch, 1963 issue of the
same quarterly periodical.
2William S. Sims, Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired),
"Promotion by Selection," United States Naval Institute Proceed-
ings
.





Despite dissatisfaction with present forms, some type of
written record of performance is indispensable in any large
organization; the larger, the more indispensable. It
need not be a numerical rating scheme, but it must be
periodic, written, and indicative of actual performance,
so far as possible on a uniform and comparable basis. 1
Some improvement in the spread of marks has been achieved
by changes in the fitness report form used— five variations in
the form were made between 19 4 3 and 1954. However, the fitness
reports continue to be graded too uniformly, and generally too
high, as noted previously.
Recommendations of the Bolte Committee
In I960, the Bolte Committee, established by the Secre-
tary of Defense, submitted its report on recommended changes to
the Officer Personnel Act of 19^7 (amended). Enactment of the
recommendations of this committee would provide for a common
promotion system for all of the armed services. If one accepts
the old adage: "imitation is the sincerest form of flattery,"
these recommendations speak well of the Navy promotion system.
The Bolte proposals recommend, basically, the adoption of the
present Navy system for all the armed forces, with a few minor
modifications. 3 Two recommended modifications which could affect
^Leonard D. White, Introduction to the Study of Personnel
Administration (3d ed. ; New York: The MacMillan Co., 1950),
pTTTO
2Needham. United States Naval Institute Proceedings
,
Vol. 86, No. 3, 61.
3Interview with an official in the Bureau of Naval
Personnel, Washington, D. C. , February 11, 1966.
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early promotions in the Navy are briefly discussed and analyzed
below.
One recommendation of the Bolte report is to increase
the present statutory limit on the percentage of promotions
which may be made from below the zone. As noted earlier, the
present limit is 5 percent of the total promotions (to any
rank) that the board is allowed to recommend. The Bolte recom-
mendation would change this maximum percentage as follows:
maintain the present 5 percent limit for promotions to lieutenant
commander and increase the allowed percentage to 7 1/2 percent
for promotions to commander, and to 10 percent for captain.
As noted in Chapter III, in recent years the Navy has not
even approached utilization of the presently allowed 5 percent
early selection rate. This being the case, it is difficult to
visualize this change, by itself, having any significant effect
on early promotions.
A second Bolte recommendation involves changes in
statutory minimum time-in-grade requirements. Table 7, below,
sets forth the current statutory limits and the limits recom-
mended by the Bolte Committee.
As can be seen from this table, this recommendation
would reduce the time required in the grades of lieutenant and
commander by one year each. The only effect this would have on
U. S., Department of Defense, "A Bill: To Amend
Title 10, U. S. Code, relating to the appointment, promotion,
separation, and retirement of members of the armed forces,
and for other purposes" (as presented to the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees), pp. 30-31. Hereafter referred to
as the Bolte Bill.
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early promotions is to allow "deeper" below-the-zone promotions
to the ranks of lieutenant commander and captain by one year
each. It seems highly questionable that this would have a
significant effect on early promotions in the Navy at the
present time.
TABLE 7.—Minimum Time-In-Orade Requirements for the Promotion
of U, S. Naval Officers
Minimums under Recommended
Grade USCA, Title 10 a by Bolteb
Lieutenant (Junior grade) 2 2
Lieutenant ^ 3




aUSCA . Title 10, Sec. 5751.
bBolte Bill
, pp. 36-37.
Early this year (January-February, 1966) it appeared
probable that a "Baby Bolte" bill— less complex and bulky than
the original form—might finally come before Congress. 1 Most
recent indications are, however, that only a few "urgent"
recommendations, none related to early promotions, have a chance
of becoming law this year.
Navy Times (East Edition), January 26, 1966, p. 1;
and February lb , 1966 , p. 1.
p
Navy Times (East Edition), March 30, 1966, p. 3.
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The "Distributed Zone Promotion Plan"
In the fall of 1965, the "Navy Retention Task Force",
headed by Rear Admiral John M. Alford, completed an extensive
eighteen months study of enlisted and officer personnel problems
in the Navy. One aspect of this study was a thorough examina-
tion and evaluation of the officer promotion system. As a
result of this evaluation, a revolutionary promotion system
entitled the "distributed zone promotion plan" was recommended,
on a "for-further-study" basis, by the Task Force. 1
The distributed zone system aims directly at solving
the problem of early selection of outstanding officers. Although
the fate of this recommendation is a matter of conjecture, a
brief discussion of the philosophy upon which it is based, and
its potential benefits and drawbacks, is considered pertinent
to the subject of this paper.
Basis for system
The Alford Task Force based its recommendation for the
distributed zone concept on the following interrelated assump-
tions: (1) "Officers do not mature professionally at the same
rate even when given identical experience and educational
opportunity," 2 and, (2) " • • • officers mature and become ready
for promotion at a normal (bell curve) rate."-'
interview with a member of the Navy Retention Task
Force, Washington, D. C, February 14, 1966.
2 U. S., Department of the Navy, Report of the Navy Reten-
tion Task Force, pre-publication draft of "Promotion Planning





In addition to the above, the Task Force felt that the
present promotion system essentially recognizes only two degrees
of ability and performance—by selection, or non-selection, at
promotion points. The historical 2 percent average early
selection rate was noted by the board, but was felt to be a
negligible exception, leaving 98 percent of all naval officers
with the knowledge *
. . .
that little or nothing they can do
will change the time at which they will be considered for
promotion."*
Description of system
The distributed zone promotion system involves the
placement of three or four year groups in a promotion zone at
one time, rather than a single year group under the present
system. The operation of the system is perhaps best described
by an example. Assume a hypothetical year group of 1000 offi-
cers, and that long-range promotion plans dictate an overall
75 percent selection rate (25 percent overall attrition rate).
The first year this year group is in the zone (determined by
statutory minimum time-in-grade) , 7.5 percent or 75 officers
would be selected. The second year in the zone f 22.5 percent,
or 225, would be promoted. The third year in the zone would
Ibid
. , pp. 6-7.
2
This basic element in the "distributed zone promotion
plan" is not a new ides. The origin, as far as the author knows,
is the following: R. G. Alexander, LCDP, USN and W. L. Read,
LT, USN, "Let's Get Fid of the Conveyor Belt!" United States




result in 37.5 percent, or 375, of the original 1000 being
selected, Assuming a four year-group zone, the fourth year
would produce 7.5 percent, or 75, promotions. The overall
result would be 750 promotions—or 75 percent of the beginning
1000-officer year group—distributed over four years in the
next higher parade. The 250 officers who failed of selection in
all of the four years their group was in the zone would be
separated from the service. Discussion of the details, and
relative merit, of such separation is beyond the scope of this
paper to present. (Numbers and percentages used in the above
example are illustrative only and do not represent any specific
promotion plan developed by the Task Force),
The overall benefit to be realized from the distributed
zone system is that it takes into account variations in individ-
ual professional development by recognizing five different
gradations of ability and performance—the four speeds of
promotion and the ultimate passover. 2 Its proponents feel that
this characteristic would both increase the incentive of present
officers, and attract more high-quality young officers to a
career in the Navy.
Drawbacks of system
As might be expected of any proposed change of such
magnitude, the distributed zone system is not without drawbacks
nor objections. One drawback, apparent to its sponsors,






... is the difficulty of phasing it in so as to avoid
injury by changing the rules in the middle of the game for
officers already in service."
Strongest objections to date have come from the United
States Marine Corps. These objections are based primarily on
the Marine Corps 1 use of a somewhat similar process in dealing
with the promotion of a large number of World War IT majors in
the years i960 through 196*1. The Marine Corps objects to the
distributed zone concept on the basis that it would:
1. Peshuffle the lineal list from time to tine and
cause confusion;
2. Upset morale and confidence by promoting substantial
numbers of Juniors over their seniors;
3. Weaken the principles of best-fitted selection.
This third objection appears directed at the fact that, in order
for the distributed zone concept to operate properly, selection
boards would be directed to promote a certain percentage from
each group in the zone each year. A fourth objection of the
Marine Corps is that "... their experience showed that an
officer leap-frogged by his Juniors would regard himself as
passed over, would feel passed over, no matter what you called
it." 3
Summary
Three possible means of providing for higher rates of
early promotion have been examined in this chapter. Potential
Navy Times (East Edition), February 16, 1966, p. 5.




benefits and drawbacks of the three proposals have been cited
from various sources. In the final chapter which follows,





Pesume of Preceding Chapters
The Intention of the author in the preceding chapters
has been to highlight the following points:
1) Chapter I set forth the role of promotions In any
organization and the importance of promotion to the individual—
especially a military officer.
2) Chanter TI presented the statutory and administrative
framework in which the promotion of naval officers Is effected.
Points from this chapter which are germane to the problem area
include: the five percent statutory limit on early promotions
to all grades below flag rank and some evidence of the stringent
requirements, applied by promotion boards, in selecting officers
from below the zone.
3) Data pertaining to the promotion of unrestricted
line officers for fiscal years 1957 through 1966 were presented
in Chapter III. Pertinent products of this chapter were the
high in-zone promotion rates for lieutenants and lieutenant
commanders and the low rates of early promotions to all ranks,
with the possible exception of the 3 percent rate to captain.
*i) Three changes recommended in recent years which are
aimed at improving the early selection rate for more outstanding




drawbacks/difficulties associated with each proposal were
briefly noted* More will be said regardinr these in the
discussion below.
Promotion as a Petention Factor
Practically nothing has been presented up to this point
regarding the direct relationship of the present naval promotion
system and the retention of talented, ambitious Junior officers
who face a choice of whether or not to make a career of the
naval service. It is highly questionable whether one could
establish a quantitative relationship such as: "if early promo-
tion rates were increased 'X* percent, •Y* (numbers of) addi-
tional outstanding young officers would become careerists." It
is recognized that promotion opportunity (early, as well as
general) is overshadowed, as a retention factor, by at least one
other aspect of a naval career—general acceptance of the
unrestricted line officer's way of life, including frequent and
prolonged deployments from home port or station.
On the other hand, the extent to which a promotion
system recognizes and rewards superior performance may be the
deciding career-selection factor for many highly-talented young
men. It seems reasonable to assume that the importance of this
factor, to the individual, would be roughly proportional to his
ambition and ability. Prom this it would follow that the more a
given career provides for differential rates of promotion,
relative to individual performance and potential, the higher the




It is imprudent to speak of retention without specifying,
to 3ome extent, the quality of personnel to which retention
efforts are to be directed. As the data for promotions over the
past ten years Indicate, less than two percent of all promotions
were made from below-the-zone categories. This represents the
total extent to which the naval promotion system has rewarded
outstanding performance (excluding the "negative rewards" of
failure of selection, with or without later promotions). This
very low rate of early selection serves as a very minimal indica-
tion that top performance is recognized and rewarded. This being
the case, it is highly doubtful if the Navy is attractive, career-
wise, to those individuals who place a premium on the use of
relative performance in determining rate of advancement.
An examination of in-zone promotion opportunity may shed
light on another retention aspect of the present Navy promotion
system. The ten-year average selection rate for officers in the
zone for promotion to lieutenant ha3 been 96.8 percent. Similar
data for lieutenant commander selections was 90.0 percent.
With promotion to lieutenant nearly a "sure thing" and subsequent
promotion to lieutenant commander (including a twenty-year
retirement "guarantee") highly probable, it is rational to assume
that the present system may prove very attractive to many young
officers who, for the good of the service, should be encouraged
to seek their careers elsewhere.
The combination of low early promotion rates and high
in-zone selection rates therefore fails to retain officers of
the caliber desired, and may, conversely, tend to retain below-
average performers in significant numbers.
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Based on the author's personal limited experience of
13 years as a naval officer, it is highly probable that a young
officer, at the career-selection point in his life, may never
have had personal contact with an officer who was among the very
few promoted early. Tt is more likely that his entire concept
of the promotion system has been formulated by observing the
nearly-simultaneous promotion of groups of officers who vary
greatly in relative performance end ability, Rased on such
observations, it is doubtful that the present promotion system
is evaluated very highly regarding its reward- of- performance
aspects.
Peasons for Low Pates of Early Promotion
Discussion of weaknesses in any system is incomplete
without attempting to determine "why?"—that is, to examine
possible reasons behind the deficiencies. In this case there
are at least two principal reasons for low early promotion rates.
The first of these has to do with overall morale of the
officer corps. This requires that the promotion system enjoy
the confidence of those whose careers are affected by it. Any
actions, such as early promotions, which tend to favor a few,
must be firmly based on merit to avoid deterioration of this
confidence. The author feels the below excerpt well-describes
the general feeling of naval officers regarding the present
promotion system:
. • • the system does . • • deserve respect. Parely do the
names of those selected or those passed over create any real
amazement among those who know the individuals involved.
Even in the case of early selection, contemporaries of the
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early selectees seldom disagree with the boards'
choices , . • .1
There has probably been a hesitancy on the part of selection
boards to select extensively from below the zone for fear of
shaking this general confidence of officers in the system.
One point may require clarification at this time. The
argument of this paper is not directed at the question of whether
or not those selected from within the zone, or those early-
selected, are the "best- fitted" of the officers in their respec-
tive zone categories. The theme of this paper is aimed at the
probability that a greater percentage of officers from below the
zone better meet the best-fitted criterion relative to some of
those selected from within the zone.
The second possible reason for limited early selections
may stem from a general promotion philosophy based on problems
connected with the promotion of World War II "hump" year groups.
Attrition, especially in promotions to the ranks of commander and
captain, has been "brutal" in many of the years following World
War II. The results of this are two- fold: (1) with low in-zone
promotion opporunity, there is a greater probability of persons
in the zone better fulfilling the best-fitted criterion and,
(2) with the corresponding hi oh attrition rates, it is perhaps
normal for the board to be hesitant in selecting from below-the-
zone, thereby further increasing in-zone attrition. The lower
early selection rate to the rank of commander (1.2 percent),
A, N. Olennon, LCDP, U. S, Navy, "Comment and
Discussion," United States Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 89,
No. 10 (October, 1563), 121.
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compared to that for lieutenant commander, (1.8 percent), is
most likely an effect of such high attrition. The 3.0 percent
rate of early selection to captain is probably a result of the
factor of high attrition being partially overcome by a second
factor—increased years of experience, providing a sounder
evaluation basis for early promotions, as discussed earlier.
Evaluation of Proposed Remedies
The proposals of the Bolte Committee—increasing the
statutory maximum early selection rate for some ranks and
decreasing the minimum time-in-ccrade requirements for others-
would have negligible effect on early promotions. Current
promotion practices do not utilize presently allowed early
promotion rates, so it is futile to expect an increase in
statutory allowances, alone, to have any effect. Coupled with
a change in the overall philosophy regarding early promotions,
however, enactment of the Bolte proposals could act to increase
accelerated promotions.
Realignment of lineal list seniority, in itself, appears
to be of questionable value in accelerating promotions. If re-
alignment is conducted in blocks of a single year group, Increased
promotion rate can be realized only to the extent that 3uch
realignment speeds entrance of officers into subsequent
promotion zones—in most cases this would have no short range
effect, but could affect promotion rates to grades two or more
ranks higher. The interrelated effects of increasing both the
early promotion rate, and the in-zone attrition rate, (especially
where the in-zone promotion opportunity rate approaches unity)
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is felt to be a far better alternative.
On the other hand, if realignment of seniority is
attempted within prroups comprising two or more year groups, not
only does the task become significantly more complex, but there
appears to be a high probability of creating serious morale
problems. The deficiencies in the fitness reports system in
providing evaluation of relative performance—especially in the
middle 60 percent, or so—makes realignment involving multiple
year croups extremely difficult. For example, where should a
superior officer, from the junior of three year groups, be
"sandwiched-in" on the seniority list relative to officers in
the most senior year group. If fitness reports gave a definitive
picture of performance and ability for each officer concerned,
this proposal would be valid. As the case exists, however,
application of realignment to multiple year-group blocks of
officers contains adverse morale factors.
The third recommended action, for making rates of promo-
tion more closely parallel relative performance, is the distrib-
uted zone promotion system. If a four-year zone of consideration
were utilized, it would probably be not too difficult to select
the first and fourth year promotions—that is, the "fast-runners"
and the "slow runners" of those who are promoted from a given
year group. However, selections of the officers to be promoted
in the second and third years, by far the majority of a given
year group, would entail the same problems of multiple year-
group realignment—the lack of sufficient definition of perform-
ance, as indicated by fitness reports, on which to base
.
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selections* A distributed-zone of three years duration would
perhaps be less complex and enjoy greater confidence of the
officer corps. Assume, for a hypothetical year group, a 75 per-
cent overall rate of promotion is dictated by long-range studies,
""his procedure might Involve selection of 5-10 percent the first
year in the zone (similar to present early promotions), 55-65
percent the second year (corresponding to present "normal"
promotions), and 5-10 percent the third year (comparable to
present above-the-zone promotions). (All percentages above
refer to percent of the total original year group). The net
result after three year3 would be 75 percent promotion and 25
percent attrition. The present promotion system provides for
such promotion practices—without even a change of name. Enact-
ment of the Bolte Committee recommendation would, of course, be
required to go above a 5 percent early selection rate. Under
the present system, the three-year selection rates would be
about 5-65-5 percent for the illustration above, Earlier promo-
tions would not necessarily be limited to only one year "ahead
of schedule". However, it appears highly questionable, when
present desired Navy flow rates are considered, whether excep-
tions to such a limitation, below selection to flag rank, are
necessary or even desirable. With the technological complexity
of modern weapons systems placing increasing demands on line
officers of every rank, the author feels a one year reduction
in time-in-grade, at each rank level, would provide the minimum
time necessary to gain the experience required of the grade and,
at the same time, provide sufficient time-in-grade for reliable




The present Navy promotion system, as it stands, provides
room for a considerable increase in early promotions. Promotions
of officers from below-the-zone , to the extent limited by law,
is recommended to positively demonstrate that the Navy recognizes
and rewards high performance on the part of its officer corps.
Such action would surely make a naval career attractive to
greater numbers of high caliber young officers.
Early promotions must not be made Just to demonstrate
that opportunity for such promotions exists—acceleration must
be firmly based on merit if confidence in the promotion system
is to be maintained. Two senior naval officers have sounded
precautionary notes, regarding early promotions, which are
pertinent
:
Somewhere along the line there is an age level below which
we must not eo [for accelerated promotion to a given rank].
We must insure that the exuberance of youth is properly
tempered by the wisdom of experience.
1
Frustration often results from immaturity. The person
who receives too much recognition too early may never
grow up. 2
Early promotions could be considerably increased in number, if
not in depth, and still give due regard to such precautions.
Early promotions would probably be increased to a
significant degree if the Secretary of the Navy's precept to the
^L. S. Sabin, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, "Deep Selections ,"
United States Naval Institute proceedlngs . Vol. 86, No. 3
(Inarch, I960;, 51.
2
A. E. Jarrell, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired),
"Lessons Learned From the Hump," United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 86, No. 8 (August, 19bu), t^5.

7*
president of each selection board strongly urged "looking below
the zone" for best-fitted officers without applying excessively
stringent requirements for early selection. Especially in cases
where in-zone selection opportunity is over about 75 percent, it
seems reasonable to conclude that at least 5 percent of those
below the zone would better meet the criterion of best fitted.
This is based on an assumption that officers develop and become
ready for promotion at a normal (bell curve) rate— as noted in
the Retention Task Force study.
In addition to improving the retention of highly-quali-
fied young officers by satisfying individual needs, the naval
service also profits by proper early selections. As noted by
Vice Admiral Sabin:
Not only does he [the early-promoted officer] deserve the
reward of accelerated advancement, but the organization
to which he is devoting his superior abilities is entitled
to the benefit of his greater talents in a position of
higher responsibility.!
The author believes that increased early selections will
become reality in the near future based on the extensive current
interest in this factor of officer career management. The
following excerpt of a recent news article contains some hope
for improvement
:
Although most officers will be promoted "on time,"
and some "late," ... to the maximum extent practicable,
selection boards should take full advantage of that portion
of the law which provides for 'deep selection.* "
Sabin, United States Naval Institute Proceedings
.
Vol. 86, No. 3, W.

75
The Chlnfo statement also stressed that use of the
maximum five percent below-the-eone promotions allowed
by law for lower grades will bring more balance to the
selection system in contrast to one very deep selection
at the flap; grade.
It*s all another step away from the strict seniority
system in effect before World War I«*
• • • and another step toward improving the naval officer corps
by increasing the retention of more outstanding officers.
Wavy Times (East Edition). March 30, 1966, p. 6, in
a discussion of a recent Chief of (Naval) Information policy
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